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HOW NEW YORK’S UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT THREATENS EXEMPTIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are living in western New York. You have a
house that you own free and clear.1 However, in the past, you
had some money troubles and one of your creditors has filed a
lawsuit against you seeking payment of the debt. In the
meantime, you get married and transfer a one-half interest in
the house to your spouse. A few years later, you lose your job,
and there is no way you are going to be able to pay off your
debts. In the face of mounting bills and no regular income, you
decide the best course is to file for bankruptcy. You meet with a
lawyer and go over your finances. The house is only worth
around $70,000 so it is exempt under New York law—that is, it
cannot be taken by creditors to satisfy a judgment or sold
during bankruptcy.2 The lawyer tells you that you will be able
to keep the house and get a fresh start. After all, that is what
bankruptcy is designed to do.
But there is a problem. After you file, the trustee alleges
that the transfer of the one-half interest to your spouse was
fraudulent under New York law.3 As a result, the trustee can
avoid the transfer and pull that one-half interest into the
estate.4 Even worse, once the interest has been pulled back into
the estate, the house is no longer exempt.5 Now the house can
be sold by the trustee, leaving you and your spouse homeless.
1 That is, not subject to any mortgages or liens.
2 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012).
3 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273-a (McKinney 2012).
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 551 (2013).
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(g), 550, 551. Sections 550 and 551 provide that property
recovered by the trustee in an avoidance action is preserved for the benefit of the
estate. Section 522(g) makes it clear that such property is no longer subject to
exemption by providing that certain types of property may still be exempted under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Hitt v. Glass, (In re Glass), 164 B.R. 759, 764-65
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) aff ’d, 60 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York recently came to this conclusion in In re Panepinto.6 In facts
largely similar to the hypothetical case outlined above, the court
held that a transfer of exempt property could be constructively
fraudulent under New York law and, after the trustee avoided the
transfer, the property was no longer exempt.7
In most states, this would not happen. The result in
Panepinto is due to the fact that New York continues to use the
outdated Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).8 The
vast majority of states have adopted the more modern Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).9 The UFTA defines “transfer”
to exclude exempt property.10 However, the UFCA, and New
York’s version of it, do not.11 According to the Panepinto court,
under New York law, a transfer of property can be fraudulent as
to the transferor’s creditors regardless of the property’s exempt
status.12 In the past, this particular quirk of the law may not
have received much attention because New York only allowed a
modest homestead exemption.13 However, because the
homestead exemption was subsequently increased, the amount
of money at stake is now much greater making this an issue
worth litigating.14
Fraudulent transfer law is designed to protect creditors
by preventing debtors from hiding property that can and should
be used to satisfy debts.15 At the most basic level, it allows
creditors to recover property and undo transfers that debtors
make in an attempt to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors.
However, when a debtor transfers exempt property, no creditor is
harmed. Regardless of the transfer, creditors had no right to the
property in the first place. Allowing the fraudulent transfer laws
6 In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
7 See id. at 374-75.
8 See Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, PRACTICAL LAW,
http://us.practicallaw.com/9-382-3892 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
9 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (1984),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/fraudulent%20transfer/UFTA_
Final_1984.pdf. Forty-three states as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands have adopted the UFTA. Id.
10 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1.
11 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
12 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371.
13 Until 2005, New York only allowed debtors to exempt $10,000 worth of real
property used as a primary residence. The current amount ranges from $75,000 to
$150,000 depending on county of residence. See id. The exemptions are found in New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 5206 and are made applicable to bankruptcy
by New York Debtor & Creditor Law sections 282-284. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney
2012); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 282-284.
14 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 374.
15 See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
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to reach exempt property does not rectify a wrong; it commits one.
Extending fraudulent transfer law to such transfers allows
creditors to reach property they have no right to simply because
the debtor was not aware of the implications of the transfer.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws’ (the Conference) recently released version of the
UFTA provides an excellent framework to guide New York in
updating its fraudulent transfer law.16 In addition to protecting
transfers of exempt assets, the new version modernizes and
updates fraudulent transfer law. The revisions seek to do away
with the confusing labels of “constructive fraud” and “actual
fraud.”17 This is an important modernization of the law given
that much of what is currently covered by fraudulent transfer
law does not require any fraudulent intent at all. The new Act
would replace “fraudulent” with “voidable” and help eliminate
confusion around interpretation of the law.18
This Note will examine the decision in Panepinto and
argue that it is time for New York to adopt the UFTA. In Part
I, the Note will briefly explain the history and purposes behind
both the homestead exemption and fraudulent transfer law.
This part will also discuss the interaction between state
fraudulent transfer law and the federal Bankruptcy Code. Part
II will examine Panepinto in depth and compare it to a similar
case in a jurisdiction that has adopted the UFTA. Part III will
establish that there is no basis in current law for reversing the
decision in Panepinto and will advocate that the New York
legislature adopt the newest version of the UFTA.
16 NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (formerly THE UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (as amended in
2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/
2014AM_AUVTA_Draft_As%20approved.pdf.
17 Actual fraud is based on intentional deception. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and
Deceit § 8 (2014). Constructive fraud is based on specific, legally defined actions which
are presumed fraudulent regardless of the actor’s intent. Id. at § 9. This means that a
person can technically be guilty of “fraud” without having any real intent to deceive
whatsoever. In light of the common understanding of the word “fraud,” applying that
label to transfers where there is no intent to deceive can be confusing.
18 NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT reporter’s introductory note (2013), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2013AM_AUFTA_Draft.pdf.
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I. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
A. History and Purpose of Homestead Exemptions
American homestead exemption laws originated in
Texas in the 1830s.19 The laws generally exempt a portion or all
of the value of a debtor’s home from being used to satisfy
judgments against the debtor. Currently, most states as well as
the Bankruptcy Code have some form of homestead
exemption.20 The purpose “of homestead exemption laws is to
protect home equity, preserve home ownership, avoid the
eviction of families, and minimize the need for public welfare
and housing assistance.”21
These exemptions represent a balancing act between
enforcing credit agreements and ensuring that debtors do not end
up as wards of the state.22 Enforcing the right of lenders and other
creditors to paid is important to ensure an adequate supply of
credit, but “the social cost of leaving a debtor and his family
without resources may outweigh the economic disadvantages of
immunizing property from the claims of creditors.”23
State-level homestead exemptions generally work to
prevent a judgment creditor from forcing a sale of the debtor’s
home to satisfy the judgment.24 Almost all states exempt at
least a portion of the debtor’s homestead from being used to
satisfy money judgments against the owner.25 These
exemptions apply in bankruptcy through 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).26
That provision generally exempts from the estate “any property
that is exempt under . . . State or local law.”27 This mechanism
19 George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289
(1950); see also State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023 (1937).
20 See Haskins, supra note 19; 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2013).
21 Timothy R. Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma:
Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 144 (2011).
22 Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1459
(1959) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Exemptions].
23 Id.
24 When a party recovers a money judgment in a lawsuit, it becomes a
judgment creditor of the debtor. If the debtor does not have sufficient cash to pay the
judgment (or refuses to), the judgment creditor can then levy the assets of the debtor
and force a sale. The judgment creditor is then paid from the proceeds of the sale.
Exemption law, including the homestead exemption, protects certain assets of the
debtor from this process. See generally 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions § 223 (2014); 46 AM.
JUR. 2D Judgments (2014).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.001 (2001).
26 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2013).
27 Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). There are some limitations and exceptions both in the
Bankruptcy Code and in state law, but the basic starting point is that a debtor in
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allows a debtor in bankruptcy to use state exemption laws to
protect her property from being liquidated to pay creditors.28
One of the central features of bankruptcy law is the
ability to provide the “honest but unfortunate debtor” a “fresh
start.”29 Saving the debtor’s home is often central to the debtor’s
potential to rebuild his finances. In addition to the potential loss
of equity, individuals without homes often struggle to find jobs.30
Increasing the number of homeless and jobless people puts
stress on the social system and drains resources from the state.
Allowing debtors to retain their homes promotes the goal of
giving honest but unfortunate debtors a fresh start. While there
are costs associated with exempting what is typically a debtor’s
largest asset from execution, the costs of evicting everyone who
cannot pay their debts and leaving them out on the street can
more than outweigh the costs to the credit system.31 Absent
exemptions, debtors may be forced to rely on public assistance,
which means the state will have to raise additional taxes or
divert revenue from other sources.
Homestead exemptions also represent a policy choice by
lawmakers to protect “the security of the family” which
“prevents pauperism and provides the members of the family
with some measure of stability and independence.”32 As one
court put it, “preservation of the home is deemed of paramount
importance.”33 In addition to providing economic advantages to
the debtor, home ownership is of public value as it is thought to
connect people to their communities and “cultivate the interest,
pride, and affection of the individual, so essential to the stability
and prosperity of government.”34 Since the legislature has
bankruptcy can exempt whatever property that state law exempts from being used to
satisfy judgments.
28 Id. § 522(b). Federal law also contains a homestead exemption for bankruptcy.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), a debtor can currently exempt up to $22,975 of his or her
aggregate interest in property that the debtor uses as a residence. Generally speaking, a debtor
can elect to use either the federal or state exemption scheme. Note that exemption values (and
many other dollar amounts) in the Bankruptcy Code are periodically adjusted for inflation
under 11U.S.C. § 104. This note uses the dollar values in effect as of the year 2014.
29 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991).
30 See Christine Schanes, Homelessness Myth #1: “Get a Job!”, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 13, 2010, 11:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christine-schanes/
homelessness-myth-1-get-a_b_339500.html.
31 Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 22, at 1459.
32 Haskins, supra note 19, at 1289.
33 In re Estate of Dodge, 685 P.2d 260, 263 (Colo. App. 1984).
34 Id.; see also Ferguson v. Kumler, 6 N.W. 618, 619 (Minn. 1880) (“The
[homestead exemption] originated in the wise and humane policy of securing to the
citizen against all the misfortunes and uncertainties of life the benefits of a home not
in the interest of [the homeowner] alone, but likewise in the interest of the state, whose
welfare and prosperity so largely depend upon the growth and cultivation among its
citizens of feelings of personal independence, together with love of country and
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chosen to enact a policy of protecting the home through the
exemption laws, these laws “should be liberally construed so as
to carry out the legislative intent.”35
B. History and Purpose of Fraudulent Transfer Laws
Fraudulent transfer law, in its most basic form, allows a
creditor to avoid transfers made by a debtor that were intended
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.36 In short, a debtor
should not be able to avoid paying his or her debts by
transferring property to a friend only to reclaim it after the
creditors have settled with the debtor or given up. These laws can
be traced back to sixteenth century English common law and the
1571 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances.37 England at the time
“had certain sanctuaries into which the King’s writ could not
enter.”38 Creditors could not go after a debtor taking refuge in a
sanctuary.39 If the debtor no longer held any property, the
creditors were left without recourse and would often settle
their claims for a relatively small amount.40
The Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances made “illegal
and void any transfer made for the purpose of hindering,
delaying, or defrauding creditors.”41 The basic structure, to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, survives in almost all
modern fraudulent transfer law.42 However, the subjective
intent of the debtor is difficult to prove.43 To decide which
transfers are intended to hinder, delay, or defraud, courts
generally have to rely on circumstantial evidence to infer the
debtor’s motives.
To address these difficulties, courts have developed a
series of factors that can be used as circumstantial evidence of
kindred-sentiments that find their deepest root and best nourishment where the home
life is spent and enjoyed.”).
35 Ferguson, 6 N.W. at 619.
36 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 829.
37 1GARRARDGLENN, FRAUDULENTCONVEYANCES ANDPREFERENCES § 58 (1940).
38 Id. at § 61.
39 Id.
40 Id. While the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances is often cited as being
designed to prevent this practice, that is not the whole story. There existed at the time
common law that allowed creditors to go after the assets of debtors who had taken
sanctuary. For more on this, see id. at §§ 58-61e.
41 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 829.
42 Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
531, 537 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy, Involuntary].
43 Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 UCC L.J.
195, 196 (1986) [hereinafter Kennedy, UFTA].
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fraudulent intent, often referred to as the badges of fraud.44
Applying these badges, the court can presume fraudulent intent
if certain conditions are met without regard to the actual intent
of the transferor.45 One of the historic badges is a transfer of
property by an insolvent debtor without fair compensation.46
This particular badge was codified in the UFCA and made a part
of the laws of the states that adopted it.47 No showing of intent is
required.48 If the conditions are met, the transfer may be
avoided.49 This is typically referred to as constructive fraud.50 It
is suggested that the drafters of the UFCA specifically intended
the law to capture transfers made by insolvent debtors for less
than fair value even if there was no intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors.51 The law treats the transfer as fraudulent to
the debtor’s creditors regardless of the debtor’s actual motive.
New York adopted the UFCA in 1925.52 The Act is
currently codified in New York Debtor & Creditor Law (NYDCL)
sections 270, et seq.53 The relevant provisions are the constructive
fraud provisions in sections 273 to 275. These provisions apply
“without regard to [the] actual intent” of the transferor.54 Any
44 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 830 (citations omitted); Philco Fin.
Corp. v. Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41 (N.D. Miss. 1971). Badges of fraud include:
(1) the lack or inadequacy of consideration;
(2) the family, friendship or close associate relationship between the parties;
(3) the retention of possession, benefit or use of the property in question;
(4) the financial condition of the party sought to be charged both before and
after the transaction in question;
(5) the existence or cumulative effect of a pattern or series of transactions or
course of conduct after the incurring of debt, onset of financial difficulties, or
pendency or threat of suits by creditors; and
(6) the general chronology of the events and transactions under inquiry
Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582-83 (2d Cir. 1983).
45 Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 537-38.
46 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 830.
47 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2013); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney
2012); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a) (1984), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/fraudulent%20transfer/UFTA_Final_1984.pdf;
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918).
48 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (“Every conveyance made and every
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is
fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made
or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.”) (emphasis added).
49 See Sklaroff v. Rosenberg, 125 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff ’d, 18
F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2001). .
50 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2014).
51 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 831-32.
52 GLENN, supra note 37, at § 62 n.73.
53 See HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1995).
54 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-274 (McKinney 2012).
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conveyance made that meets the requirements of sections 273 to
275 can be deemed fraudulent without any showing that the
debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his or her creditors.55
Once such a conveyance is deemed fraudulent, the creditors can
have the conveyance annulled, set aside, or directly levy on the
property as if the conveyance never happened.56
To understand the issues raised in Panepinto, it is
important to look in detail at some sections of New York’s
UFCA, particularly sections 270 to 273-a.57 Section 273 makes
fraudulent any conveyance made without fair consideration by
a person who is insolvent or is made insolvent by the
conveyance.58 Section 271 defines a person as insolvent “when
the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the
amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his
existing debts as they become absolute and matured.”59 Section
273-a makes fraudulent any conveyance made without fair
consideration by a person who is a defendant in an action for
money damages if the final judgment is not paid.60
To avoid a transfer under sections 273 and 273-a, the
party seeking to avoid the transfer must show that the
transferor did not receive fair consideration.61 Section 272
defines fair consideration as receiving property that is a fair
equivalent to the property transferred or the satisfaction of an
antecedent debt.62 It can also include an exchange that is not
equivalent so long as it is not “disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained.”63 Section 270 also contains some important
definitions. First, a “‘[c]onveyance’ includes every payment of
money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge
of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any
55 See Paradigm BioDevices, Inc. v. Viscogliosi Bros., LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d
661, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. Lefrak, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901,
905 (App. Div. 1979), aff ’d, 401 N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1979).
56 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278.
57 In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 372 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013). The court only
discusses constructive fraud in relation to section 273-a, but the creditors raised both
sections 273 and 273-a in their motion. Further, the analysis the court uses could apply
equally to any of the constructive fraud provisions found in sections 273-275. For
purposes of this note, I will focus only on sections 273 and 273-a. Sections 270-272
supply important definitions that are referenced in §§ 273 and 273-a.
58 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273.
59 Id. § 271.
60 Id. § 273-a.
61 Id. §§ 273 & 273-a.
62 Id. § 272(a).
63 Id. § 272(b).
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lien or incumbrance.”64 Second, “‘assets’ of a debtor means
property not exempt from liability for his debts.”65
In summary, the essential rules are: (1) a transfer made
for no consideration while a person is insolvent or a defendant
in a lawsuit can be deemed fraudulent without any intent on the
part of the debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud her creditors and;
(2) the word “conveyance” as used in these statutes covers any
type of property including property that would normally be
exempt from execution by creditors. Taken together, these points
mean that a creditor could technically seek the avoidance of a
conveyance of property even though the property cannot be used
to satisfy the debtor’s obligation. However, there is little
incentive to seek avoidance in such a case because even if the
conveyance is set aside or annulled, the creditor still cannot
levy on the property.66 In this situation, returning the property
to the debtor does not help the creditor’s position at all. This all
changes once we add the Bankruptcy Code into the mix.
C. How State Fraudulent Conveyance Law Interacts with
the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code has its own fraudulent
conveyance provisions, namely 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548.
Section 547 covers preferential payments67 and § 548 mirrors
the core provisions of the UFCA but vests the power to avoid
fraudulent transfers in the trustee rather than the creditors.68
64 Id. § 270.
65 Id.
66 See Corbin v. Litke, 431 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding
that homestead exemption would still apply after avoidance of transfer).
67 In general, a preference is a payment made by a debtor, while insolvent, on
account of an antecedent debt, to a creditor within 90 days of the debtor filing for
bankruptcy. For more information, see generally Robert Weisberg, Commercial
Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 3 (1986) and Vern Countryman, The Concept of A Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985).
68 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2013) provides that:
The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the
benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the
benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor,
that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of
the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
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In addition to these specific avoidance statutes, the trustee can
also take advantage of the relevant state-level fraudulent
transfer law through § 544. That section generally gives the
trustee the power to avoid any transfer that a creditor of the
debtor could avoid under applicable law.69 In New York, this
would include NYDCL sections 273 and 273-a.
Assuming the trustee avoids the transfer of exempt
property under one of these provisions, what happens next? As
noted above, the likely result under state law outside of
bankruptcy would be that the creditor is still prevented from
going after the exempt property.70 However, that is not the
result under the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 551 and
522(g), the exempt property will not only return to the estate
but will also lose its exempt status.71 Section 551 simply states
that any property recovered through an avoidance action in
bankruptcy becomes property of the estate.72 Once the property
is back in the estate, § 522(g) ensures that the exemption no
longer applies.73 So long as the transfer was voluntary, the
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such
obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract
and not in the ordinary course of business.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
69 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.”).
70 See Corbin, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 802. In this case the creditors successfully
avoided a conveyance of real estate between husband and wife as fraudulent, but the
court stated that the defendants would be entitled to the full statutory homestead
exemption if the property was properly designated as a homestead. Id.
71 Hitt v. Glass (In re Glass), 164 B.R. 759, 764 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), aff ’d,
60 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The purpose of § 522(g) is to prevent a debtor from
claiming an exemption in recovered property which was transferred in a manner giving
rise to the trustee’s avoiding powers, where the transfer was voluntary or where the
transfer or property interest was concealed.”).
72 11 U.S.C. § 551 (“Any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547,
548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, or any lien void under section 506(d) of this title, is
preserved for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate.”).
73 11 U.S.C. § 522(g).
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estate gets the benefit of the recovered property regardless of
its exemption status.
Thus, under a state law action, even if a creditor can
avoid a transfer as fraudulent, the debtor is still entitled to the
statutory exemptions. However, because of §§ 551 and 522(g) of
the Bankruptcy Code, when a trustee does the same thing in
bankruptcy, the debtor is no longer entitled to claim
exemptions in the property. To illustrate this problem, we now
turn to Panepinto.
II THEUFCA AND THEUFTA IN ACTION
A. UFCA: Panepinto
Panepinto was originally filed as a chapter 7 liquidation
case on April 23, 2012.74 It was later converted to a chapter 13
case on July 17, 2012, and the debtor filed a plan under 11
U.S.C. § 1322.75 The debtor listed her residence, a home she
owned jointly with her husband, as an exempt homestead under
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (NYCPLR) section 5206.
However, the debtor originally owned the home by herself, free
and clear of any liens. In 2008, she transferred an ownership
interest to her husband, and since that time, they held the house
jointly as tenants in the entirety. At the time the transfer was
(g) Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor may exempt
under subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee recovers under
section 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the
debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section
if such property had not been transferred, if—
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the
debtor; and
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or
(2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(1)(B) of
this section.
Id.
74 See Docket, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-
11230) [hereinafter Panepinto Docket].
75 See id. In a Chapter 13 case, the debtor is required to file a plan that meets
the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 & 1325. Unlike a Chapter 7 liquidation case
where a debtor surrenders all non-exempt property but keeps his or her future income,
a Chapter 13 case generally allows a debtor to keep all of his or her assets while
pledging to pay creditors from future income. The plan details the terms of those future
payments and, in general, must provide for payments to creditors that at least equal
what the creditors would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See generally 9 AM.
JUR. 2D §§ 68, 72 Bankruptcy.
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made, the debtor was the defendant in an action seeking a
money judgment filed by Target National Bank.76
After the debtor filed her chapter 13 plan, two of the
creditors objected to the plan arguing, inter alia, that the
transfer of the ownership interest to the debtor’s husband was
fraudulent under both NYDCL sections 273 and 273-a.77 The
transfer could be held fraudulent under section 273 because
New York law presumes the debtor is insolvent when the
transfer is voluntary and the debtor does not receive fair
consideration.78 The transfer could also be fraudulent under
section 273-a because, at the time of the transfer, the debtor
was a defendant in an action for monetary damages and had
not paid the final judgment.79
The debtor filed a motion to dismiss the objections
arguing, inter alia, that the transfer was not fraudulent
because the interest transferred was subject to state exemption
law.80 The creditors argued that New York’s version of the
UFCA defines “conveyance” as any “payment of money,
assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of
tangible or intangible property,” and the term “property”
includes exempt property.81 The court agreed with the creditors.
It noted that, despite the many cases from other states that held
differently, under New York law the transfer could be avoided.82
The court attributed the inconsistency to the fact that New York
still uses the UFCA while nearly every other state has adopted
the UFTA. Both the UFTA and the UFCA define “asset” to
exclude exempt property of the debtor.83 However, the UFTA
defines “transfer” as disposing or parting with an “asset” and
76 Objections Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1325 and Bankruptcy Rules 3020[,] 11
U.S.C. 522(l) and Bankruptcy Rules 4003, Opposition to Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. 522(f) at ¶ 1.e, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-
11230-MJK) [hereinafter: Creditor’s Objections].
77 Id. at ¶ 1.
78 Hassett v. Far West Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.,
Inc.), 40 B.R. 380, 393 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff ’d, 44 B.R. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
debtor in Panepinto raised the issue of consideration in her motion to dismiss the
objections. Debtor’s Response to Creditors’ Objections Together with Motion to Dismiss
Objections at ¶ 17, In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter
Debtor’s Response]. However, the judge did not address this issue when ruling on the
motion and the objections and focused instead on section 273-a. Panpeinto, 487 B.R. at
372. It is undisputed that the debtor was involved in a lawsuit at the time of the
transfer and had not paid the judgment so this issue was easier to address. Creditor’s
Objections, supra note 76, at ¶ 1(e).
79 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273-a (McKinney 2012).
80 Debtor’s Response, supra note 78.
81 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270.
82 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 374.
83 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1 (1984); see also N.Y. DEBT. &
CRED. LAW § 270.
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not “property.”84 Therefore, a transfer of exempt property, by
definition, cannot be fraudulent under the UFTA but can be
fraudulent under the UFCA. The court also stated that the
provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 551 and 522(g) would work to
eliminate the exemptions the property might be protected by
once the transfer was avoided.85
It should be noted that the ruling in Panepinto did not
conclusively decide the case.86 At this point, no party had filed
an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the transfer.87 The
issue was raised in the context of an objection to the debtor’s
chapter 13 plan and the debtor’s motion to dismiss those
objections.88 In ruling on these motions, the court simply denied
the debtor’s motion to dismiss the objections, sustained the
objections of the creditors, and declined to confirm the plan
without prejudice.89 The court did rule that, as a matter of law,
the transfer in this case could be avoided, and that if it was, the
debtor would not be entitled to an exemption.90 However,
because there was no adversary proceeding before the court
seeking to avoid the transfer, the court did not rule that the
transfer would be avoided at that time.91
In making this ruling, the court explicitly drew a
distinction between states that adopted the UFTA and ones
that still use the UFCA.92 The court noted that many courts in
different states had held that a transfer of exempt property
was not fraudulent.93 However, the court stated that the
language of the UFCA compelled a different result.94 The court
went on to make it clear that the sole basis for its ruling was
the difference in language.95 In a state that has adopted the
UFTA, this would not happen.
B. UFTA: In re Blanch
As the Panepinto court noted, there is a significant
difference between the terminology in the UFCA and UFTA. In
1979, the Conference decided it was time to update the UFCA
84 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1(12) (emphasis added).
85 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371.
86 Id. at 375.
87 See id. at 374.
88 Id. at 375.
89 See id. at 374-75.
90 Id. at 371.
91 Id. at 374-75.
92 Id. at 373.
93 Id. at 374.
94 See id.
95 See id.
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and developed the revised UFTA in 1984.96 The goal was to
update the UFCA to accommodate the various changes in other
commercial laws since its promulgation in 1918.97 Currently, 43
states as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
have adopted the UFTA.98 One of the most obvious changes
made to the law was the change in terminology from conveyance
to transfer. The drafters stated that this change was made
because the word “conveyance” is closely associated with real
estate transfers, and they wanted to make clear the intent of the
UFTA to cover all transfers of property.99 This change was more
profound than the drafters realized at the time.
The case of In re Blanch, from the Bankruptcy Court for
the Central District of Illinois, is illustrative of this point.100
The facts of Blanch are quite similar to Panepinto. The debtor
had conveyed his otherwise exempt homestead to his parents
approximately two years prior to filing for bankruptcy.101 After
the transfer, he continued to reside there.102 The trustee
brought an action against the debtor’s parents to avoid the
transfer as fraudulent under Chapter 740 of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes sections 160/5 and 160/6.103 The defendants
countered that the transfer was not fraudulent because the
property would have been exempt anyway.104 They pointed out
that under Illinois’ version of the UFTA, “transfer” as defined
in 160/2 is the “disposing of or parting with an asset.”105 As the
court noted, “asset” does not include “property to the extent it
is generally exempt under laws of this State.”106 As a result, the
court held that “[p]roperty which is encumbered by a lien or
96 Kennedy, UFTA, supra note 43, at 198.
97 Id. at 198-99.
98 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (1984).
Legislation is also pending in several states to adopt the most recent version of the act.
Legislation, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislation.aspx
(last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
99 Kennedy, UFTA, supra note 43, at 199.
100 See Covey v. Blanch (In re Blanch), Nos. 97-82652, 98-8011, 1998 WL
34065289 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998).
101 Id., at *1.
102 Id.
103 Id. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/5 contains the main fraudulent transfer
language that covers actual fraud (intent to hinder, delay, or defraud) and fraud
related to incurring subsequent debts. 106/6 is the constructive fraud provision that
allows avoidance of transfers while the debtor was insolvent. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
160/5, 160/6 (2014) (similar to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney 2012)).
104 Blanch, 1998 WL 34065289, at *1.
105 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 160/2(l) (emphasis added); see also Blanch, 1998 WL
34065289, at *2.
106 Blanch, 1998 WL 34065289, at *2 (citing 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/2(b)(2)).
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subject to a homestead exemption is not an asset which is
subject to recovery as a fraudulent transfer.”107
Comparing the results of Panepinto and Blanch, as well
as the court’s discussion in Panepinto, shows that the root of
the problem is the difference between the UFCA and the
UFTA, at least to the Panepinto and Blanch courts. The next
section will consider whether there are any grounds under
existing law to overturn the decision in Panepinto and argue
that the easiest and best solution to avoid this inconsistency is
for New York to adopt the UFTA.
III NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT THE 2014 UFTA
A. There Are No Grounds Under Existing Law to Overturn
This Ruling.
There are two potential, but ultimately unsuccessful,
grounds for overturning the decision in Panepinto. First, the
reviewing court could decide that these types of transfers are
subject to the “no harm, no foul” rule. Second, since this case is
interpreting state law, there could be precedent from New York
courts holding that transfers of exempt property are not
fraudulent under state law. However, there is no precedent
directly on point from New York courts to guide the federal
courts in interpreting this state law issue.
1. The “No harm, No Foul” Rule
As noted in Part I, both fraudulent transfer and
exemption law have been part of the American legal system for
many years. Some jurisdictions adopted a “no harm, no foul”
rule when determining whether to avoid transfers of exempt
property.108 The basic idea behind this rule is that if the property
would not have been available to creditors prior to the transfer
then the transfer cannot be fraudulent as to the creditors.109
107 Id., at *2. It is interesting to note that the defendants also cited precedent
in Illinois law, some of which predates even the UFCA, that held that transfers of
exempt property could not be fraudulent. Id. It appears that Illinois was an early
adopter of the “no harm, no foul” rule for fraudulent transfers. See infra Part III.A.1.
However, the court did squarely address the language of the UFTA and held that this
language completely protects exempt property from fraudulent transfer law. Blanch,
1998 WL 34065289, at *2.
108 Dana Yankowitz, Comment, “I Could Have Exempted It Anyway”: Can A
Trustee Avoid A Debtor’s Prepetition Transfer of Exemptible Property?, 23 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 217, 227 (2006); see also Jarboe v. Treiber (In re Treiber), 92 B.R. 930,
932 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988).
109 Treiber, 92 B.R. at 932.
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Illinois is a good example, and the Blanch case discussed above
provides a good summary of the case law on the issue. As far
back as 1880, well before the adoption of the UFCA, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that “[n]o conveyance of property exempt
from execution can be considered fraudulent as against a
creditor.”110 However, for both legal and policy reasons, full
embrace of the “no harm, no foul” rule is not a viable option.
For the most part, federal courts have rejected the “no
harm, no foul” approach when applying the fraudulent transfer
provisions found in the Bankruptcy Code itself. Key examples
are the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Tavenner v. Smoot111 and
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision in In
re Trujillo.112 Both cases directly held that a transfer of exempt
property under 11 U.S.C. § 548 could be avoided as fraudulent
and that § 522(g) prevented the debtors from claiming the
property as exempt once the transfer was avoided.113 Although
some bankruptcy courts have explicitly endorsed the “no harm,
no foul” rule,114 the positions taken in Tavenner and Trujillo
represent the current majority position.115
Despite this, there is some authority for continuing or
even expanding the “no harm, no foul” rule. In 1990, the
Supreme Court in Begier v. I.R.S. seemed to endorse at least a
limited version of the “no harm, no foul” rule as to preferences
under 11 U.S.C. § 547.116 The Court found that “an interest of
the debtor in property” for purposes of § 547 only includes “that
property that would have been part of the estate had it not
been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings.”117 The Court relied primarily on the policy behind
fraudulent transfer law.118 It stated that the purpose of § 547
was to help insure “[e]quality of distribution among
110 Leupold v. Krause, 95 Ill. 440, 444 (1880).
111 Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001).
112 Trujillo v. Grimmet (In re Trujillo), 215 B.R. 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997),
aff ’d, 166 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
113 Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 406-07; Trujillo, 215 B.R. at 204-05 & n.5.
114 See, e.g., Treiber, 92 B.R. at 932 (“No creditor is injured when the entire
subject matter of a preference consists of exempt property. If the property had not been
conveyed, the creditors would not have shared in it. In short,—no harm, no foul.”);
Noland v. Turner (In re Turner), 45 B.R. 649, 651 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Thus, it
serves no purpose for the Trustee to seek the avoidance of a transfer which removed no
non-exempt property from the estate or which does not deplete the estate in some way.
Such transfer does not hinder, delay or defraud any creditor, since creditors would not
have benefited from the property if there had been no transfer.”).
115 See Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 219.
116 Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
117 Id. at 58.
118 See id.
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creditors.”119 It further stated that “if the debtor transfers
property that would not have been available for distribution to
his creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, the policy behind the
avoidance power is not implicated.”120
While Begier only covered preferences under § 547, the
Southern District of New York in Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v.
Gredd used the language of Begier to extend the rule to
§ 548.121 That court stated that:
While Begier and its progeny were concerned with § 547 rather than
§ 548, the “normal rule of statutory construction that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning,” counsels us to construe this language to have the same
meaning when it is used in § 548(a)(1)(A).122
The court ultimately concluded that a transfer could only be
avoided when the property would have been available to
creditors.123
Whether this fully protects transfers of exempt property
from avoidance under § 548 is not clear. Technically, the
property in Begier and Bear Stearns was never property of the
estate to begin with. Exempt property is considered property of
the estate until the debtor elects the exemption.124 The logic of
many courts in allowing § 548 to reach transfers of exempt
property focuses on this distinction.125 Prior to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which created the modern Bankruptcy
Code, property subject to exemption never became property of
the estate.126 Further, the text of § 522(g) seems to endorse the
avoidance of transfers of exempt property since it prevents
debtors from asserting an exemption on property that has been
recovered by the trustee.127
The court in Panepinto considered whether the holdings
in Begier and Bear Stearns should guide its decision, but
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Gredd), 275 B.R. 190, 193-94
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
122 Id. at 194 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)).
123 Id. at 196 (“We thus conclude that § 548(a)(1)(A) only permits a trustee to
avoid a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property when, but for the transfer, such
property interest would have been available to at least one of the debtor’s creditors.”).
124 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 541(a)(1) (2013). All interests of the debtor become
property of the estate per § 541 and the debtor is then allowed to exempt certain
property out of the estate per 522(b).
125 See, e.g., Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2001).
126 Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 347 n.10 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g); see also Trujillo v. Grimmet (In re Trujillo), 215 B.R.
200, 205 & n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
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ultimately decided that the precedents did not apply because the
provision at stake was § 544, not §§ 547 or 548.128 However, the
crux of the determinations in Begier and its progeny and Bear
Stearns was the definition of “an interest of the debtor in
property.”129 Those courts held that “an interest of the debtor in
property” did not encompass property that would not otherwise be
available for creditors.130 Section 544 uses the same phrase, “an
interest of the debtor in property.”131 The court in Bear Stearns
based its extension of Begier to § 548 in part on the concept that
“the ‘normal rule of statutory construction that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning.’”132 Since § 544 uses identical words, the same
principles that apply to “an interest of the debtor in property” in
§§ 547 and 548 should also apply to § 544.
To justify its decision not to extend Begier and Bear
Stearns, the Panepinto court stated that the maximum two
year “look back” period of §§ 547 and 548 indicates that the
focus is on the “slide into bankruptcy” and courts are thus more
concerned with the “impact of pre-petition transfers [on]
the . . . bankruptcy estate.”133 The court stated that “§ 544 is
different[,]” but did not elaborate.134 But, even if the court
decided that § 544 should be treated the same as §§ 547 and
548, Begier and Bear Stearns are still not applicable because
they dealt with an entirely different type of property. In both
cases the property in question was property that would not
have been part of the estate in the first place.135 While both
opinions have language that seems to endorse a general “no
harm, no foul” rule,136 the interest in property at stake in
128 In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 371 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
129 Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53,58 & n.1 (1990); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v.
Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
130 See Begier, 496 U.S. at 58; see also Bear, Stearns, 275 B.R. at 196.
131 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
132 Bear, Stearns, 275 B.R. at 194 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
484 (1990)).
133 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371 n.2.
134 Id.
135 Begier, 496 U.S. at 59 (“Because the debtor does not own an equitable
interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not ‘property of the
estate.’”); Bear Stearns, 275 B.R. at 198 (“[W]e conclude that the transfers sought to be
avoided were not transfers of ‘an interest of [the Fund] in property’ because the federal
securities laws do not permit non-brokerage house creditors to recover the transferred
assets.”) (second alteration in original).
136 Begier, 496 U.S. at 58 (“Of course, if the debtor transfers property that
would not have been available for distribution to his creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the policy behind the avoidance power is not implicated.”); Bear Stearns,
275 B.R. at 195 (“A transfer of property, even if made with fraudulent intent, that does
not leave any creditor in a worse position than he would have been had the transfer
never occurred, obviously does not offend the policy behind § 548(a)(1)(A).”).
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Panepinto is fundamentally different than the interest in
property at stake in either Begier or Bear Stearns.
Consequently, these cases do not provide a firm ground
for holding that a transfer of exempt property cannot be
fraudulent as to the debtor’s creditors. The court would also
have to address both the fact that a majority of courts reject
the “no harm, no foul” rule when it comes to exempt property,
and that the clear language of the Code indicates a
congressional intent to capture such transfers.137 Further, there
are also policy reasons for not extending the “no harm, no foul”
rule to bankruptcy.
2. Problems With the “No Harm, No Foul Rule” in the
Bankruptcy Context
Excluding transfers of exempt property from the Code’s
fraudulent transfer provisions would likely create more
problems than it would solve. In Lasich v. Wickstrom, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan
addressed some of the policy reasons for not adopting the “no
harm, no foul” rule.138 It presented several hypothetical
situations concerning application of the “no harm, no foul” rule,
one of which does an excellent job highlighting a potentially
serious problem and is worth exploring.
In the hypothetical, the court imagined a couple who
decide to transfer their home to a third party on the eve of
bankruptcy and then elect to take the federal exemptions
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) and (5).139 The court then asked
whether preventing the trustee from avoiding this transfer
under the “no harm, no foul” rule really would result in no
harm to the debtors’ creditors.140 The answer, of course, is no.
Preventing fraudulent transfer law from reaching this transfer
could result in serious harm to creditors. Before seeing exactly
why this is the case, it is important to briefly discuss the
difference between state and federal bankruptcy exemptions.
Many states, including New York, allow debtors filing
for bankruptcy to elect either the federal exemptions or the
exemptions available under state law.141 This option matters for
137 Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 229-33.
138 See generally Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
139 Id. at 348.
140 Id.
141 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 284-285 (McKinney 2012). New York used
to limit debtors to only the exemptions available under state law. DEBT. & CRED § 284.
When this was changed with the passage of § 285, the legislature left § 284 as it was. A
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New York residents because the New York homestead
exemption is much more generous than the federal homestead
exemption.142 A person who has any significant amount of
equity in her home will typically elect the state exemptions in
order to protect what is usually her largest asset.143
However, when it comes to personal property, the
federal exemptions can be much more generous than New
York’s. Many exemption schemes (including both federal and
New York) exempt property based on category and dollar
limit.144 For example, under New York law, a debtor is allowed
to exempt a car worth up to $4,000, professional tools up to
$3,000, jewelry up to $1,000, etc.145 Federal law is similar.146
However, federal law has a provision found in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(5) that is often referred to as the “wild card”
exemption.147 This provision allows a debtor to exempt any type
of personal property up to a limit of $1,225.148 This subsection
also allows the debtor up to an additional $11,500 from any
unused portion of the federal homestead exemption.149
Therefore, a debtor who is not claiming a homestead exemption
can exempt a total of $12,725 worth of any property the debtor
chooses under the federal exemptions. The wild card exemption
is in addition to the other categorical exemptions allowed under
§ 522(d). If a debtor is eligible for all the personal property
exemptions under federal law, the total value of exempt
property can reach above $30,000.150 New York state law has no
wild card exemption and also caps personal property
exemptions at $10,000.151 Thus, if a debtor has both a home and
person only reading § 284 might conclude that New York law only allows state
exemptions, but § 285 states that an individual debtor may choose the federal
exemptions instead “[n]otwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law.” DEBT. &
CRED. § 285.
142 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2012) (allowing $150,000,
$125,000, or $75,000, depending on county of residence), with 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)
(2013) (allowing $22,975).
143 See Brian Powers, Note, Can You Trust Your Trustee? Expanding
Homestead Exemptions to Include Rent-Controlled Leasehold Interests, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 741, 748 (2012).
144 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205; MASS. GEN. LAWS 235
§ 34 (2014).
145 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205.
146 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (allowing up to $12,250 worth of household goods,
$1,550 worth of jewelry, etc.).
147 See, e.g., Martin v. Cox (In re Martin), 140 F.3d 806, 807 (8th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the wild card exemption).
148 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).
149 Id. This is approximately half of the total $22,975 allowed under § 522(d)(1).
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
151 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 283 (McKinney 2012).
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a significant amount of personal property, the question of
which exemption scheme to choose poses a serious dilemma.
Let us return to the hypothetical raised by the
Wickstrom court and add some more facts. Assume the
husband and wife own the home jointly and the husband also
owns an expensive automobile currently worth around $10,000.
The home is located in Manhattan, and their equity in the
property is under the $150,000 cap for New York’s homestead
exemption.152 If the husband were to file for bankruptcy and
elect state exemptions, they could keep the house but would
lose the car.153 However, if the husband transfers the house
solely to his wife before he files, he would not have to worry
about taking an exemption for the house and could choose the
federal exemption scheme. Under the federal exemptions, and
without having to worry about a homestead exemption, he
could use the wild card provision to fully exempt the car.154
Such a transfer on the eve of bankruptcy is a classic
fraudulent transfer, but if the “no harm, no foul” rule were in
play, the trustee would be unable to do anything about it. The
debtor has now benefitted from both the federal and state
exemptions at the expense of his creditors. This is a clear case
of a transfer designed to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and
fraudulent transfer law should be able to reach it. Extending
the “no harm, no foul” rule to this case allows the debtor to
protect assets (in this case, an expensive car) that should
otherwise be available to his creditors.
Thus, extending the “no harm, no foul” rule to generally
cover all transfers of exempt property in bankruptcy is not a
viable solution. Not only could it result in serious harm to
creditors, such as in the hypothetical above, but a majority of
bankruptcy courts have already rejected it.155 However, the law
being used to avoid the transfer in Panepinto is based on state
152 One hundred fifty thousand dollars is the current maximum exemption for
real property used as a primary residence in the county of New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 5206 (McKinney 2012).
153 New York law caps the exemption value of automobiles at $4,000. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5205(8) (McKinney 2012). The husband would still be able to take advantage
of this exemption, but since the car is worth more than the exemption, the trustee
would be able to sell the car as part of the estate. See, e.g., In re Mannone, 512 B.R.
148, 153-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the trustee may only sell exempt
property when the sale will realize value above the exemption limit and that any such
value in exempt property sold by the trustee inures to the benefit of the estate). After
the sale, the husband would receive $4,000 (the exemption amount) from the sale
proceeds with the remainder going to the estate.
154 Federal law caps the exemption value of automobiles at $3,675, but the
wild card exemption (assuming no homestead) could easily cover the remaining value.
11 U.S.C. § 522.
155 See Yankowitz, supra note 108, at 219.
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law, not federal law. Thus, state law precedent could provide
grounds for overturning the Panepinto decision.
3. State Law Precedents
The transfers in Begier, Bear Stearns, and the Wickstrom
hypothetical are both subject to either §§ 547 or 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, the transfer in Panepinto concerned
application of § 544 and New York’s UFCA. Under § 544, the
trustee can avoid any transfer that a valid creditor of the debtor
could otherwise avoid under applicable law.156 In this case, the
applicable law is New York’s version of the UFCA.
The court in Panepinto concluded that New York’s
version of the UFCA allowed the avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances of exempt property. However, there are no New
York cases directly on point, and there are some New York
cases that even seem to support the “no harm, no foul” rule.
There is also a long history of similar holdings from other
states. The “no harm, no foul” rule was originally applied in the
context of state-level fraudulent transfer law and numerous
state courts have held that a transfer of property that is not
reachable by creditors due to statutory exemption cannot be
fraudulent.157 While this impressive list of decisions is not
156 11. U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2013).
157 See, e.g., Flirt v. Kirkpatrick, 175 So. 2d 755, 758 (Ala. 1965) (“A sale or
other disposition of property which is by law exempt from payment of debts cannot be
impeached by creditors as fraudulent, since creditors cannot be deemed concerned with
property not subject to their demands.”); Montgomery v. Bullock, 77 P.2d 846, 849 (Cal.
1938) (“[A] creditor is not entitled to complain of the transfer by the debtor of an asset
which he could not have reached, had the debtor retained it.”); Sneed v. Davis, 184 So.
865, 870 (Fla. 1938) (“[T]he corporate stock at the time of the alleged fraudulent
conveyance was exempt from sale under execution and, therefore, was property which
could not be subjected to the claim of the creditor against the consent of the owner and
as to which there could be no conveyance in legal fraud of creditors.”); St. Marie v.
Chester B. Brown Co., 370 P.2d 195, 197 (Idaho 1962) (“If the property, before transfer,
was exempt from execution then a creditor could not reach it and a subsequent transfer
would deprive the creditor of no rights.”); Rossow v. Peters, 115 N.E. 524, 525 (Ill.
1917) (“[A] conveyance of property exempt from the payment of debts is not fraudulent
as to creditors.”); Isgrigg v. Pauley, 47 N.E. 821, 821 (Ind. 1897) (“The whole doctrine of
annulling fraudulent conveyances rests upon the ground that the creditor has the right
to resort to the property, and where he has no such right it is impossible that a
conveyance can be deemed fraudulent.”); Hall Roberts’ Son, Inc. v. Plaht, 114 N.W.2d
548, 549 (Iowa 1962) (“As sometimes said, so far as exempt property is concerned, there
are no creditors.”); Saunders v. Graff, 173 P. 413, 413 (Kan. 1918) (“[T]here is no fraud
in withholding exempt property from satisfaction of a debtor’s obligations. Creditors
are not concerned with any disposition which the owner may make of it.”); Tewmey v.
Tewmey’s Assignee, 65 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1933) (“[C]reditors cannot be defrauded,
hindered, or delayed by the transfer of property which neither at law nor in equity can
be made to contribute to the satisfaction of their debts, and hence it is almost
universally conceded that property which is by statute exempt from execution cannot
be reached by creditors on the ground that it has been fraudulently transferred.”);
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binding on New York, there is also no precedent to the
contrary. Further, at least two older New York cases and one
modern case suggest that New York law also excludes exempt
property from fraudulent transfer law.
The first of the two older cases is Zoeller v. Riley,
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1885.158 In a note
following the opinion that appears unrelated to the case at
hand, the court stated that “the conveyance of property exempt
from execution cannot, under any circumstances, be made out
to be a fraudulent conveyance.”159 However, as this is not part
of the official opinion and does not relate to the facts of the
case, it is dicta at best. Further, this case and the one that
follows were decided prior to New York’s adoption of the UFCA
and its definition of “conveyance.”
The second older case is McDonald v. McDonald,160
where a defendant against whom a judgment had been
obtained transferred all of her property away before the
judgment could be satisfied.161 The plaintiff brought an action
to avoid the transfers.162 The New York Supreme Court held
the transfers fraudulent and affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff.163 However, at the end of the opinion, the court
Legro v. Lord, 10 Me. 161, 165 (1833) (“No creditor can be, in legal contemplation,
defrauded by a mere conveyance made by his debtor of any of his property, which such
creditor has no right by law to appropriate or even to touch by any civil process.”);
Mannan v. Merritt, 93 Mass. 582, 583 (1866) (“A creditor cannot by an attachment
impeach the validity of the sale by his debtor of articles which are exempt by law from
attachment, upon the ground that such sale was fraudulent as to creditors.”); Bresnahan
v. Nugent, 52 N.W. 735, 736 (Mich. 1892) (“It has been frequently held that a creditor
cannot complain of any disposition which a debtor sees fit to make of exempt property.”);
Sisco v. Paulson, 45 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. 1950) (“Exempt property is not susceptible of
fraudulent alienation, and creditors ordinarily have no right to complain of the
disposition made of it, since they cannot be prejudiced thereby or claim that it is a fraud
upon them.”); Chandler v. Welborn, 294 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1956) (“It is well settled
that a conveyance of exempt property may not be attacked on the ground that it was
made in fraud of creditors.”); Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietjen, 225 P. 598, 600 (Utah
1924) (“A homestead cannot be made the subject of attack by a creditor upon the ground
that it was sold or conveyed in fraud of such creditor.”); Darling v. Ricker, 35 A. 376, 377
(Vt. 1896) (“There can be no fraud as against creditors in the conveyance of property
exempt from attachment.”); Boynton v. McNeal, 72 Va. 456, 460 (1879) (“[A] creditor
cannot be said to be hindered, or delayed, or prejudiced by a fraudulent conveyance
embracing property subject to the homestead, because the debtor is entitled to hold it
exempt from the payment of his debts.”); First Wis. Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling,
272 N.W. 664, 664 (Wis. 1937) (“It has always been the rule in this state that a
conveyance of property which is exempt cannot be deemed fraudulent as against
creditors.”); see also 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraudulent Conveyances & Transfers § 74 (“A debtor’s
transfer of an interest in property that is exempt cannot be fraudulent as to creditors.”).
158 Zoller v. Riley, 2 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1885).
159 Id. at 399.
160 McDonald v. McDonald, 11 N.Y.S. 248 (Gen. Term 1890).
161 Id. at 248.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 249.
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discussed a point “suggested by the appellant which should
have some further consideration.”164 The court noted that these
transfers included some furniture and other household goods
that were exempt property beyond the reach of creditors.165 The
court flatly stated that the creditors of the defendant were not
defrauded by the transfer of the exempt property.166 While the
court affirmed the judgment, it modified it to exclude any
property subject to exemption from execution.167
The more recent case is Prestige Caterers, Inc. v.
Siegel.168 In this Appellate Division case from 2011, the
defendants hired a catering company but never paid the bill.169
The catering company sued and obtained a judgment.170 In the
course of enforcing the judgment, the catering company sought
to set aside several transfers as fraudulent.171 The defendants
sought to dismiss the complaint arguing that the transfers in
question could not be fraudulent because they consisted of
social security benefits that were exempt from execution by
creditors.172 The court ultimately denied the motion because the
complaint also alleged transfers of funds that were not social
security benefits.173 While the court did not directly address the
issue, the implication from the court’s language was that it
would have dismissed the complaint had it only alleged
transfer of exempt funds.174
Looking at these three New York cases, the lack of any
New York precedent going the other direction, and the
numerous decisions from other jurisdictions, the Bankruptcy





168 Prestige Caterers, Inc. v. Siegel, 930 N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).





174 Id. (“Although social security benefits are protected from execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, and, therefore, do not constitute
assets as defined in Debtor and Creditor Law § 270, the complaint adequately alleges
the fraudulent conveyance of other assets and funds which are not exempt from
liability for [the alleged] debts.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citations omitted)). Note that when discussing the social security benefits, the
court states they “do not constitute ‘assets’ as defined in Debtor and Creditor Law
§ 270.” Id. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
property transferred was exempt and therefore could not be fraudulent. Id. However,
as discussed above, a fraudulent conveyance under New York law is not concerned with
the transfer of ‘assets’ as defined by § 270; it is concerned with property. See supra note
65 and accompanying text. One wonders whether any of the lawyers involved in this
case brought this distinction to the attention of the court.
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transfer of exempt property cannot be fraudulent. As the
Panepinto court pointed out, “11 U.S.C. § 544 is different.”175 It
would not be inconsistent with federal court precedent to hold
that §§ 547 and 548 can reach a transfer of exempt property
and that § 544(b) cannot. Section 544(b) turns on state law and
not federal law, so a court would be justified in holding that a
transfer of exempt property, while subject to fraudulent
transfer law under the provision found in the Code itself, was
not subject to state fraudulent transfer law.
The court in Blanch endorsed a very similar
conclusion.176 In that case, the court compared §§ 544 and 548,
stating that “[t]he trustee’s powers to avoid transfers under
each provision are wholly separate and independent of one
another.”177 Specifically, the court noted that “cases decided
under the Bankruptcy Code . . . rejected the ‘no harm, no foul’”
rule, but that this did not affect the analysis under state law.178
Because avoidance under § 548 is based on the Bankruptcy
Code and avoidance under § 544(b) is based on state law, there
is no inconsistency in holding that they operate differently.
What mattered in this case was how Illinois state law would
treat the transfers in question.
There are also policy reasons to treat avoidance under
§ 548 differently from avoidance under § 544(b). Section 548, as
the court in Panepinto noted, is concerned with the “slide into
bankruptcy.”179 It can only reach transfers that were made
within two years of the bankruptcy filing.180 Most state
fraudulent transfer laws reach back further than two years.
New York provides for a six-year statute of limitations on
fraudulent conveyance actions181 and most UFTA jurisdictions
apply a four-year statute of limitations.182 A transfer,
regardless of actual intent, made immediately before filing for
bankruptcy is inherently more suspicious than one made
several years before filing. Presumably, a debtor is much more
aware of financial distress closer to filing and should be more
careful in the disposition of his assets.
175 In re Panepinto, 487 B.R. 370, 371 n.2 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013).
176 In re Blanch, Nos. 97-82652, 98-8011, 1998 WL 34065289 at *2 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Panepinto, 487 B.R. at 371 n.2.
180 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2013).
181 Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that constructive
fraud actions under NewYork law are subject to six-year statute of limitations).
182 See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/10 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A
§ 10 (2014); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (1984).
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One justification for constructive fraud provisions is to
do away with ambiguous questions of intent. As previously
noted, actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is
rarely susceptible to direct proof. In devising the objective
markers that make a transfer fraudulent without regard to the
intent of the transferor, the drafters of the UFCA knew that
they would likely sweep up some transfers that were made
without any intent to defraud creditors.183 This was considered
acceptable when balancing out the policy goals of the statute.184
In the same spirit, applying such provisions with more
force immediately before the bankruptcy makes sense. It is
much more likely that a transfer right before filing for
bankruptcy will harm creditors. Zealously going after
potentially fraudulent transfers made in a short time period
before bankruptcy fits with the goals of the system. However, it
also makes sense to be a bit more forgiving when it comes to
transfers made as long ago as six years prior to a bankruptcy
filing, particularly when the result could be the debtor losing a
home that her creditors never had any legal right to in the first
place. If a debtor tries to engage in the sort of subterfuge that
hinders, delays, or defrauds creditors she should not be
rewarded. But that does not mean that a creditor should enjoy
advantages it was never entitled to. The result would be to
force a family out of their home because a completely innocent
transfer ran afoul of an archaic law.
Despite both the case history and the sound policy
reasons for holding that a transfer of exempt assets is not
subject to state fraudulent transfer law, the fact remains that
the plain language of the UFCA in New York, combined with
the Bankruptcy Code, seem to compel this result. New York
law defines “conveyance” as any transfer of property without
respect to exemption.185 It is unclear whether a New York court
would rule that the transfer in Panepinto was fraudulent. The
best solution is for New York to join the rest of the country and
adopt the UFTA.
B. Solving the Exemption Problem with the UFTA
The Conference is currently considering amendments to
the UFTA (now known as the Uniform Voidable Transactions
183 Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 831-32.
184 See Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 534-35 (discussing how the
drafters of the UFCA wanted to eliminate questions of intent in order to improve
creditors’ remedies).
185 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
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Act (UVTA)).186 The release of the UVTA is an excellent
opportunity for New York to join the other 43 states that have
already adopted some version of the UFTA.187
The failure of New York to adopt a version of the UFTA to
date threatens the state exemption system. The exemptions are
there for a reason. The property set aside as exempt from
creditors is the property the state has decided is essential to
everyday life. Stripping debtors of this property creates social
costs that far outweigh the costs of leaving some debt uncollected.
The goal should be to strike a balance between ensuring creditors
are paid, which is essential to a healthy credit system, and
preventing debtors from becoming wards of the state. Bankruptcy
goes hand-in-hand with this system to prevent debtors from
falling into a cycle of debt they can never escape.
Society and the economy as a whole are better off when
people can live normal lives and make positive contributions to
the economy. It is also important for the economy to maintain a
healthy credit system, and, to do that, we must have
procedures in place to ensure creditors are paid.188 But this can
also go too far. Allowing creditors to take everything debtors
own risks putting debtors in a position where they have no
alternative but to live on public assistance.189 This in turn
raises costs for the rest of society.
Both goals are important. Proper recovery mechanisms
for creditors in the case of default encourage lenders to make
more loans.190 Access to credit is not only essential to the
modern economy,191 it can also be a key factor in reducing
poverty and promoting economic development.192 However, it is
well-settled “that exemptions in bankruptcy are to be liberally
construed in order to afford the honest debtor a fresh start.”193
The debtor’s fresh start is important because not only does it
help the debtor and her family, it also provides “benefits [to]
186 NAT’L CONF. OF COMMR’S ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. VOIDABLE
TRANSACTIONS ACT (FORMERLY UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (formerly THE
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT) (as amended in 2014), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2014AM_AUVTA_Dr
aft_As%20approved.pdf.
187 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, references & annots (2006)
(outlining the UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, adopted in 43 jurisdictions.).
188 See Kennedy, Involuntary, supra note 42, at 534.
189 Bankruptcy Exemptions, supra note 22, at 1459.
190 Luke Shimek & Rajdeep Sengupta, Access to Credit, ECONOMIC SYNOPSES
no. 4, 2007, available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/07/ES0704.pdf.
191 Jacques Sapir, Credit, Indebtedness and Economic Growth, RUSSEUROPE,
(Sept. 1, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://russeurope.hypotheses.org/1500.
192 Shimek & Sengupta, supra note 190.
193 In re Abbott, 408 B.R. 903, 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
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the rest of society by reviving the debtor’s incentive to work
and participate productively in the economy.”194
Thus, it is important to strike a balance between ensuring
creditors are paid and preventing debtors from becoming wards of
the state. We need a system that allows creditors a sufficient
recovery to keep credit flowing at reasonable rates while at the
same time ensuring that debtors have enough protections to
recover if they find themselves unable to pay their debts. The
system of exemptions is a key part of that balance. If we then
allow the law to undermine and frustrate those exemptions
unnecessarily, we risk upsetting the balance and causing harm
to the economy.
There is also a moral dimension to limiting how much
creditors should be allowed to take. As a society, we do not want
to see debtors stripped of everything they own and forced onto
the street. Creditors should not be allowed to literally strip a
debtor naked and take everything, from the family house to the
debtor’s books and even pets. The exemption laws in this
country protect the things that are essential for a person to live
with dignity in modern society. We should not allow this system
to be undermined by a technical definition of the word
“conveyance.”
There is also no policy reason to hold exempt property
subject to state fraudulent transfer law. The purpose of the law is
to recover property that can be used to pay creditors. The
exemption scheme is specifically designed to put certain property
beyond the reach of creditors. Allowing fraudulent transfer law to
alter the balance clearly intended by the legislature undermines
the policy goals of the exemption statutes. Simply put, not
updating the law is against the policy of the state.
That is not to say no potential issues exist if New York
were to adopt the UFTA or otherwise protect transfers of
exempt property from fraudulent transfer law. If fraudulent
transfer law could never reach exempt assets, it would be
possible for someone who owns a house to transfer that house
to a third party for no consideration, then use all his remaining
assets to purchase a new, exempt house. When he files for
bankruptcy, he will have no non-exempt assets, and the trustee
will be unable to avoid the transfers. Here, we see a debtor
exploiting the rules to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. However,
there are several solutions to this problem. First, in order to take
194 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep the Car?
Some Thoughts on Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 471, 473 (2002).
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advantage of the UFTA, he would have to have transferred the
house more than two years before filing for bankruptcy. Otherwise,
the transfer could simply be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 548 which
reaches transfers of exempt property.195
Second, the bankruptcy courts have always retained the
ability to dismiss cases when they find the debtor has abused
the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A), the
bankruptcy court can dismiss the case if it finds the petition
was not filed in good faith.196 It is not hard to imagine a
bankruptcy court finding that the actions of our hypothetical
debtor in exploiting the exemption system to prevent
substantial assets from becoming available to his creditors
constitutes bad faith and abuse of the system.
Third, if these protections are not enough for the
legislature, it can always add additional protections as part of
the adoption of the UVTA. An easy example would be to
generally exclude transfers of exempt property from the
constructive fraud provisions while specifically including exempt
property in cases where there is evidence of actual fraud. All the
legislature would need to do is set out a separate section
making it clear that transfers made with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors are voidable regardless of
any exemptions that may apply to the property transferred.
Even if the New York legislature chooses not to adopt
the UVTA, there is still a simple fix available: they can
redefine “conveyance” to exclude exempt property. This would
require simply changing the word “property” to “asset” in the
definition of “conveyance” found in NYDCL section 270. The
current law already defines “asset” to exclude exempt
property.197 This change will promote the policy objectives of
the exemption statutes, but will not undermine any current
policy objectives of fraudulent transfer law.
CONCLUSION
For the debtor in Panepinto, this particular saga is over
as the court confirmed the debtor’s plan.198 But the underlying
issue—whether transfers of exempt assets are subject to
195 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
196 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A) (2013).
197 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270 (McKinney 2012).
198 The court in Panepinto confirmed the Debtor’s plan on Dec. 30, 2013.
Panepinto Docket, supra note 74. A further review of the docket indicates that the
specific controversy with the main creditor has been settled. Id. The specific details are
not currently available, but no fraudulent transfer adversary proceeding was filed. Id.
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fraudulent transfer law in New York—remains unresolved.
Now that a bankruptcy court has opened the door to
challenging this type of transfer, trustees in future cases could
potentially sell an entirely exempt homestead out from under
an innocent debtor. Trustees are not in the business of kicking
debtors out of their homes, but they have a fiduciary duty,
imposed by law, to get the best return on a debtor’s assets for
the benefit of the estate. The only way to ensure that this
tragic scenario does not occur at some point in the future is to
change the law.
Adopting the UVTA would not be inconsistent with the
current fraudulent conveyance law in New York. There is no
indication the legislature intended to expose exempt property to
fraudulent transfer law. If the dispute in Panepinto were outside
bankruptcy, then, even if the transfer was avoided, the house
would still be exempt because it would return to the debtor
under the homestead exemption. If New York had intended for
exempt property that was fraudulently transferred to be
available to creditors, there would be some mechanism in state
law to strip the exemption after avoidance. The lack of such a
provision creates the inference that the legislature did not
intend for exempt property to lose its exempt status because it
was part of a constructively fraudulent transfer.
To remedy this situation and ensure that the exemption
system functions as it is supposed to, New York should take the
upcoming amendments to the UFTA as an opportunity to
update its fraudulent transfer law and join almost every other
state in upholding the integrity of exempt property. If the state
declines to do this, it should, at a minimum, change the
definition of “conveyance” in the fraudulent transfer statutes to
ensure that the exemption laws work as they should: to protect
property essential to everyday life.
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